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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No.

vs.

20060646

BRIAN K. MILLER,
Defendant/Appellant

ARGUMENT
POINT I: SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE IS PRECLUDED, AS A MATTER OF LAW
FROM CLAIMING RESTITUTION.
It is crucial for the Court to understand that the Defendant does not
challenge the statutory right of the trial court to determine and assess restitution, in
accordance with the statutory scheme as part of the disposition in criminal cases.1

"When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
disposition. . . . " Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302(l) (2004 as Amended).
Similarly, Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (2004 as Amended) provides,
"[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement."
1

Further, the Defendant's position in this matter is entirely consistent with the
provisions of Utah Code and interpreting case law, which include insurers within
the definition of "persons" that may qualify as a "victim" for purposes of
determining and awarding restitution.2
Rather, the issues created by the applicable statutory language are two in
number. First, does Safeco qualify as a victim under the other requirements of the
statute. Second, is there a conflict between the provisions of the restitution statute
that include insurers generally within the class of persons who may be treated as
"victims" and the specific and well-developed statutory scheme that prohibits
personal injury protection insurers from recouping any PIP payments from the
insured.
In order to clearly understand the issues and to determine the standard by
which they should be resolved, it is necessary to present the history and detail the
specificity with which the legislature and the courts have dealt with each of the
statutes.

Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302 (2006 as Amended) provides in relevant part: ".
.. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 7738a-102(14). Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-102(14) (2006 as Amended) provides
that "(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities.
2

A.

The Statute That Includes "Insurers" in the Class of
Persons who may be Considered "Victims" is Very General
and Non-Specific.

The history of statute leading to the inclusion of insurers as "persons" who
could be considered as victims under the restitution statute reveals the general
nature of the statute. In State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah, 1988), Judge Stirba
denied the State's request for restitution covering losses for which the victims were
insured. Judge Stirba ruled that, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i)
(Supp.1997), as interpreted in State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695 (Utah
Ct.App.1997), that "a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution ... to a victim
who has already been reimbursed by the victim's insurance carrier." Id. The State
filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ directing Judge Stirba to order the defendant
to pay the victims the $9,312.50 value of their car, even though that amount was
covered by their insurance. Id. at 920.
Although the decision in the case turned on the breadth of relief available
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, the Utah Supreme Court held that Judge Stirba had
improperly interpreted the restitution statute then in effect.

The Court noted that

Judge Stirba had based her ruling on State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695 (Utah
Ct.App.1997), where it was held that "an insurance company is not a victim as
defined in [the restitution statute]" and therefore not entitled to restitution
3

payments. Id. at 699. The Court noted that the restitution statute applicable when
Judge Stirba entered her ruling provided that "[fjor purposes of restitution, a victim
has the meaning as defined in Section 77-38-2/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1997), which section defined "victim" as any natural person
against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or
attempted . . . . " (Emphasis added). Id.
The Court held that Westerman could not have been relied upon by Judge
Stirba because the restitution order challenged in Westerman was an order
mandating payment of restitution directly to the victimfs insurer. See id. at 696.
In Striba, by contrast, the restitution sought by the State was to be paid directly to
the victim.

Accordingly, because the restitution recipient was to be the very

persons against whom the charged crime was perpetrated, and not an insurer, the
Court held that Judge Stirba misapplied the Westerman holding in interpreting the
restitution statute. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court in Stirba, then summarized the remaining history
relating to the inclusion of insurance companies as potential victims:
We also note that the Legislature has addressed the substantive issue
in this case, i.e., the propriety of restitution orders for amounts
covered by a victim's insurance. Following the Westerman ruling, the
Legislature took the Westerman court up on its suggestion to "enact
remedial legislation," 945 P.2d at 695 n. 5, dealing with any
unintended effects of that decision. See 1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1.
4

Hence, effective May 4, 1998, the restitution statute defines "victim"
as "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(e)(i) (Supp.1998). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1998). Because this definition is far less restrictive
than the definition considered in Westerman and certainly broad
enough to include insurance companies, the Legislature's 1998
amendment has effectively superseded the Westerman decision.
Id at923.
In State v. Dominguez, 992 P.2d 995 (Utah App.,1999), the court noted that
in amending the statute and changing the definition of "victim" for purposes of
restitution, the Utah Legislature incorporated a definition already existing within
the sentencing statute instead of borrowing the definition used in the Rights of
Crime Victims Act. See 1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1. That new definition of
"victim" was "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(l)(e)(i) (1999). See id § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) ("For purposes of restitution, a
victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection (l)(e)."). The Utah Court of
Appeals concluded that the amendment broadened the definition to include
insurance companies and "effectively superseded the Westerman decision." State v.
Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 923 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.1998). Id
The amendment to the restitution statute, although implemented to address
the holding in Westerman, does not even explicitly include insurers. It is only by
5

the interpretation of the courts that "person" as opposed to the pre-existing "natural
person" was broad enough to include insurance companies. Of course, the same
argument could be made by any legal "person" such as partnerships, corporations,
etc.
Neither the legislature nor the courts have examined or determined the scope
of the general inclusion of "insurers" as entities that may qualify as "victims under
the restitution legislation.

Further, neither the legislature nor the courts have

examined whether the amendment was intended to reach specific defined insurance
schemes such as the PIP-no fault system.
B.

The Legislative and Case Matrix Restricting the Right of
PIP Insurers From Recouping Payments From Their
Insureds is Specific and Definitive.

As opposed to the general and non-specific nature of the inclusion of an
insurer in the class that may qualify as "victims," the legislative and case history
relating to the prohibition against PIP insurers recovering PIP payments from their
insureds is express, detailed and clear.
The case law starting with Allstate Ins, Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah,
1980), supports the Defendant's position: As noted by the Ivie Court,
The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of compensation system which
couples the payment of benefits on a no-fault basis with the partial
elimination of fault-based tort actions for both economic losses and
6

pain and suffering. This system generally continues to permit faultbased claims for pain and suffering in the more serious cases and for
economic losses above no-fault benefits. A system which has no tort
exemption at all is not a "no-fault" insurance. The Utah no-fault
statute is a compulsory, partial tort exemption law coupling no-fault
insurance benefits, Section 6, with a partial elimination of tort claims
for bodily injury.
Id.
It is axiomatic that if a tortfeasor has the required PIP coverage or acceptable
alternative security, that torfeasor is not, as a matter of law, liable to others in the
accident or their insurers for the PIP benefits paid pursuant to a policy.

As

succinctly stated by the Ivie Court:
There is no provision in the statutory scheme to indicate the tortfeasor who has complied with the security provisions of the act,
becomes personally liable for the PIP benefits provided in Section
6, when the injured party is entitled under the threshold provisions of
Section 9(1) to maintain a claim for personal injuries. In such a
situation, the injured party should plead only for those damages for
which he has not received reparation under his first party insurance
benefits. (Emphasis added)
Id.
The reasoning of the Court is clear and easy to understand. The whole basis
of a no-fault system is premised on certain PIP payments being paid by an
insurance company to its insured, without consideration of fault,

that no one,

neither the victim nor the paying insurance company, can collect against the
alleged torfeasor. If either the victim or the paying insurance company could aim
7

around and sue the tortfeasor for the PIP payments, the system would not be a nofault system-but rather a mirror of the fault based system that preceded no-fault.
The Ivie Court noted that the only exception to the right of an insurer paying
PIP benefits not being allowed to recoup the payments, is the statutorily allowed
mechanism of binding arbitration between carriers. U.C.A. 31A-22-309 (2001 as
Amended) provides:
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers1 Compensation Fund created
under Chapter 33, the insurer of the person who would be held legally
liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in
excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the
insurers.
The Ivie Court explained:
The Utah law preserves subrogation-like rights of reimbursement
among no-fault insurers. That is, after an insurer pays no-fault
benefits, it is entitled to reimbursement from the insurer of a negligent
driver who would have been liable in tort to the injured person but for
the partial tort exemption. These claims for reimbursement are
declared to be subject to mandatory, binding arbitration between the
insurers. This would appear to be an undesirable preservation of fault
based claims among insurers.
8

Id
The Court then answered, in precise language, the issue in this case.
Specifically, does Utah's No Fault statutes allow an insurance company, who has
paid PIP benefits to its insured pursuant to a policy for which it received a
premium, to seek recoupment of those PIP payments against the tortfeasor.
Under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, the tort-feasor who has
the required security, is not personally liable to the injured person
for payment of Section 6 benefits, Section 9(2); therefore, the tortfeasor has no personal legal obligation to reimburse the injured
party's insurer. (Emphasis added)
M a t 1202-03.
The Court addressed the issue again in Laub v. South Central Utah
Telephone Ass'n, Inc., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah,1982) and stated again
explicitly, "[t]o begin with, a tortfeasor who has the required security is liable
neither to the injured party nor to the no-fault insurer for reimbursement of PIP
payments." See also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 608 P.2d 235 (Utah, 1980)
(holding that Automobile liability insurer was not entitled to recover no-fault
payments made to its insured out of proceeds of settlement with third-party tortfeasor).
As noted by the Court in Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah, 1981), the
system is to eliminate double recovery by the insurance company.

9

If there was any confusion, the same was resolved by Speros v. Fricke, 98
P.3d28(Utah,2004):
West American has a statutory right to seek reimbursement from
Nationwide for the PIP benefits it paid to Speros, but the
appropriate forum is arbitration. Pursuant to section 31A-22309(6) of the Utah Code, arbitration is the exclusive forum in
which an insurer may seek reimbursement from another insurer
for its payment of PIP benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)
(2003). We recently addressed the scope of this mandatory arbitration
provision in Regal Insurance Co. v. Canal Insurance Co., 2004 UT
19, % 1, 93 P.3d 99. In Regal, we held that the mandatory
arbitration provision of section 31A-22-309(6) "applies to
reimbursement disputes based on issues of coverage, as well as
reimbursement disputes based on issues of fault/5 Regal is
controlling here and requires us to affirm the trial court's ruling that
West American lacked standing to sue Nationwide for reimbursement
of the PIP payments it made to Speros. (Emphasis added)
The tortfeasor is simply not liable to the insurance company disbursing PIP
benefits. Stated another way, Safeco has no legally recognized claim against a
tortfeasor for PIP payments. The statutes and interpreting case law are specific in
detailing the prohibition against insurers seeking reimbursement of PIP payments
and the policy supporting the same.
C,

The Issues in This Case may be Resolved Short of Ruling on
the Conflict in the Statutes.

Defendant submits that there are two grounds upon which the issues in this
case may be resolved without resolving the apparent conflict between the two
statutes.
10

1.

Safeco did not Sustain Pecuniary Damage

U.C.A. 76-3-201(l)(c) (2003 as Amended) defines f,[p]ecuniary damages"
as ". . . all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could
recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses." (Emphasis added)
Throughout these proceedings, Defendant has argued that Safeco did not
sustain damage. All parties to the underlying automobile accident were fully
insured.

Safeco either waived, for consideration, any and all rights to

reimbursement of its PIP payments (as discussed hereinafter) or Safeco was
obligated, and in fact, participated in the mandatory arbitration related to it's
payment to its insured, under the personal injury protection of its policy and
recouped any monies paid. The trial court did not require, and Safeco did not
volunteer, a statement as to whether it considered itself bound by its waiver, as
discussed hereinafter, or reveal the amount of money that Safeco received in
binding arbitration from the Defendant's insurance company, Unigard. Further
Safeco received premiums in exchange for assuming the risk of the claim.
Certainly this Court must consider the practice of waiving repayment of PIP
11

payments and binding arbitration provisions of the no-fault law an integral part of
the same system under which Safeco paid its PIP payment to its insured.
Defendant submits that not to require Safeco to divulge what it received in binding
arbitration from the other carrier or acknowledge that it considered itself bound by
the waiver it gave, is clear error. One cannot be obligated to reimburse an insurer
who pays money under a PIP insurance contract without enforcing a waiver or
deducting from the claim the amount received by the insurance carrier in
arbitration.
Defendant submits that this Court should hold that the failure of the claimant
to admit it waived its rights to repayment or divulge the amount of the arbitration
reimbursement under no-fault is dispositive of Safeco's claim.
Additionally, Safeco, who paid a claim pursuant to a contract, was not a
"victim" as contemplated by the statute.3 Considerable authority exists to support

In People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 232, the California Supreme Court
held that an insurance company is not a "direct victim" of a crime unless the
insurance company is the "object" of the crime. (And see People v. Ozkan, 124
Cal.App.4th at p. 1077, fh. 2.) The question in Birkett was whether an insurance
company was entitled to restitution for sums paid to reimburse the crimerelated losses of its policy holder. The court held that it is not, distinguishing
the situation where the insurance company is the "object" of the crime, meaning
that the insurance company's loss was the immediate and direct result of the
crime, from the situation where the insurance company's "loss" results from a
contractual obligation to reimburse the "object" of the crime for crime-related
losses. (People v. Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 232.). If a party's loss is the
12

the notion that an insurer who simply pays a loss pursuant to a contract is not a
"victim." Certainly, if the insurance company is the direct victim of crime, it could
be a "victim" as contemplated by the statute.
2.

Safeco is Statutorily Barred From Recovery

There is no question that recovery of damages by Safeco in a restitution
hearing is limited to the definition provided in the statute: ?f [pecuniary damages"
as all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities. . . . " (Emphasis added) U.C.A.
76-3-201 (l)(c) (2003 as Amended). The Defendant has established categorically
that Safeco could not, as a matter of law, recover its PIP payments from the
Defendant in a civil action. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled categorically on
that subject.
The State of Utah, in response, make incongruous arguments. First the State
argues that no-fault is a civil issue and restitution is a criminal matter (See
Appellee's Brief at 11). Of course, no-fault is civil; and restitution is criminal!

direct result of the crime, the party is a direct victim, entitled to restitution. If
someone else sustains the loss, and the party in question reimburses the loss as
a result of a contractual obligation, the party is not a direct victim. Id.
13

That argument does not make sense in light of a restitution statute that specifically
limits recovery to what a party could get in a civil action.
Second, the State argues that the statute really does not mean what it says
and that although the statute limits recovery to what could be obtained in a civil
action, a judge in the restitution proceeding can use the statute as a guideline and
really, has flexibility to award more relief that could be obtained in a civil action
(See Appellee's Brief at 12). However, the State cannot cite one case to support its
argument. Reference is made to State v. Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000 (Utah, 2002). No
where in Weeks does the Court even hint that a trial court is not bound by the
limits of what is recoverable in a civil action. 4 The State finally cites State v.
Gibson, 153 P.3d 771 (Utah App.,2006). Again the State's analysis is simply
incorrect. The court in Gibson awarded and the appellate court upheld a restitution
award that was greater than had been awarded in the civil action. However, as
noted by the Court of Appeals, it was not because the trial court was allowed to
deviate from the requirements of the statute regarding what could be recovered in
civil actions; rather,

4

Rather, the Court in Weeks simply noted, in deciding that the rules of evidence should not
apply to sentencing proceedings, that at the time of sentencing, a judge balances a number
of different considerations and needs flexibility in issuing punishment. No where does
the Court even intimate that the statute limiting restitution to what could be recovered in
a civil action should not be fully enforced.
14

The statute specifies that when considering what the victim "could
recover against the defendant in a civil action," the action must arise
"out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal
activities." Id. In the civil case, the court awarded a default judgment
based on Gibson's fraudulent conversion of funds during the 2001
third and fourth quarters. In this case, the restitution award covered all
of Gibson's criminal activities from 2000 through 2001. Because the
civil judgment covered a smaller time period than the restitution
award, it did not address the same "facts or events constituting
[Gibson's] criminal activities." Id. Therefore, the restitution award did
not exceed any limits allegedly set by the plain language of the statute.
Id.
Thus Gibson, instead of supporting the State's position, actually supports the
Defendant's position that the trial court must comply with the statute limiting
recover to what could be recovered in a civil action. Of course, there are no issues
in this case that resemble the parallel civil action and difference in loss periods as
existed in Gibson.
Fourth, citing State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, (Utah App. 1992), the State
seems to be arguing that because restitution is to be considered something to aid
rehabilitation, that the trial court can disregard the statute (See Appellee's Brief at
12-13). A review of the case reveals that the Court of Appeals said nothing that
could be construed as a license to disregard the statute limiting recovery to that
which could be obtained in civil actions. The Court in Twitchell made comment on
the right of the trial court to impose a "civil penalty" in addition to restitution. In
this case the trial court was not asked, did not discuss and made no ruling
15

regarding civil penalties. The trial court awarded restitution based upon the statute
cited herein.
Defendant submits that the statute limiting restitution to that which could be
recovered against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities is clear and unambiguous and has
been strictly enforced by this Court. Under the clear law relating to Utah's no-fault
law, there is simply no question that Safeco could not recover its PIP payment
from the Defendant.
D.

A Consideration of the Conflict Between the Statutes
Mandates the Enforcement of Utah's No-Fault Law.

Using the rationale urged by the State, there is a clear conflict between the
relevant statutes. Utah Code Annotated 76-3-201(e)(l) (2007 as Amended) defines
a victim as a "person" who suffers pecuniary damage. The Courts have held that
definition encompasses insurance companies, as potential victims. If this Court
chooses to disregard the statute that limits the recovery of any victim, including
insurance companies, to what could be recovered in a civil action (U.C.A. 76-3201(l)(c) (2003 as Amended), there is a clear conflict with Utah's No-Fault statute
and interpreting case law (U.C.A. 31A-22-309 (2001 as Amended)).

16

When interpreting statutes, the court first looks to the plain language of the
statute. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 104 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2004). The Court
presumes ". . . that the legislature used each word advisedly and give[s] effect to
each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning/5 C.T. ex rel Taylor v.
Johnson, 977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the Court reads ". . . the plain language of the statute as a whole, and
interprets] its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592 (Utah 2003). The Utah Appellate
Courts have been clear that no other interpretive tools are not needed in analyzing
the statute when the language of the statute is plain. Adams v. Swensen,, 108 P.3d
725 (Utah 2005). But if the Court finds the provision ambiguous, the Court then
seeks guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations."
State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 528 (Utah 2001).
Importantly, when the Court is faced with two statutes that purport to cover
the same subject, the Court follows general rules of statutory construction. Jensen
v. IHCHosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997). The Court's primary goal ". . .
is to evince 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through]
the plain language of the Act.' " Hall v. Dep't ofCorr.,,

24 P.3d 958 (Utah

2001)(alteration in original) (quoting Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). Determining the legislature's intent requires that
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the court ". . . seek to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful, and
we accordingly avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative." Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Thus, when the court is confronted with two statutory provisions that conflict, "the
provision more specific in application governs over the more general
provision.55 Id.
It is respectfully submitted that the legislature in amending the category of
entities that could qualify as a "victim" under the restitution statute, did not seek to
amend Utah's no-fault law. There is no legislature history that indicates that the
intent, in amending the restitution statute, was to undo Utah's no-fault system. In
fact, there is no evidence that the effect of the amendment on the no-fault matrix
was ever discussed. Certainly, even if the legislature had considered the issue, they
could rightfully have concluded that the amendment would not have any effect on
the no-fault statute because the restitution statute required that before an insurance
company could claim restitution, it would have to satisfy the court that it had an
enforceable civil claim. On the other hand, the clear prohibition against a PIP
insurer recouping payments from a party in the accident is so clear from the statute
and interpreting case law, that this Court has to find that it was the legislature's
intent to leave in place the relevant portions of Utah's no-fault law, relating to the
right of an insurer to recoup payments from another party.
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Defendant submits that the Court can construe the statutes as consistent by
simply holding that although an insurance company may be a victim, its claim has
to be viable in a civil court. There is only a conflict between the statutes if the
Court rules that the fact that an insurance company can be a victim means it can
proceed with any claim, whether it is civilly viable or not.
Lastly, there is no question that the legislative scheme relating to the
prohibition against PIP insurers recouping payments from other persons in an
accident, is specific and thorough. On the other hand, the simple amendment of
the definition of a 'Victim" can hardly be claimed as a definitive statement on the
no-fault scheme in Utah. Accordingly, if there is any conflict, as deemed by this
Court, the no-fault legislation is more specific and thorough.
It is submitted that the No Fault statute is clear and the language of the Utah
Appellate Courts is likewise clear. A paying PIP provider may not recoup the PIP
payments from a tortfeasor who is insured.

The restitution statute does not

conflict. It only allows the recovery of pecuniary damages that could be recovered
in a civil action. Clearly, PIP payments are not among those items. Defendant
submits that based upon the statutes and authority set out above, the claim of
Safeco for restitution based upon PIP payments made under a policy of insurance
must be disallowed, as a matter of law.
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POINT II: SAFECO IS PRECLUDED FROM MAKING A
RESTITUTION CLAIM BASED UPON ITS CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS WAIVER.
The State's response to the claim of the Defendant that Safeco waived its
right to make any claim for repayment ignores the reality of tort insurance practice.
Although the State terms the waiver as "cryptic" (Appellee's Brief at 15), there is
no question that it explicitly waived PIP subrogation.

In every day practice,

Unigard who insured the Defendant that was a culpable tortfeasor, would routinely
request of Safeco, the carrier for the non or less culpable person, the waiver of the
PIP subrogation, before tendering policy limits.

If the insurance agency in

Safeco's position declined, Unigard would reduce its policy limit offer by the
amount of the subrogation claim. If Safeco agreed to waive its subrogation of the
PIP payment, Unigard would then offer its full policy limits to Safeco's insured.
The scenario outlined above occurred in this case. The waiver does not limit itself
to waiver of the rights in binding arbitration. It states that Safeco has ". . . agreed to
waive [its] subrogation rights." (R. 422) The waiver was all inclusive as to all
persons who conceivably could be liable to Safeco for reimbursement of PIP
payments.
Utah courts have held that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Tt must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied/ "

20

Interwest Const v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (citing Webb v.
R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah Ct.App.1989)).
Safeco had a right via its contract of insurance and the statutory language
upon which it was based, to pursue its subrogation right in binding arbitration with
Unigard, Defendant's earner. A "[w]aiver of a contractual right occurs when a
party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent with its contractual
rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing party or parties to the
contract." Interwest Const, 886 P.2d at 98. In this case, the waiver of subrogation
was bargained for and was given by Safeco.
Again, based upon the statutory definition of pecuniary damages, if Safeco
had a viable claim in a civil action for reimbursement of PIP payments, which the
Defendant disputes, there is no question that the claim could be waived by any
party including Safeco. If a voluntaiy waiver was given, the waiver would be a
total defense to the action. Thus, Safeco could not be deemed to have a viable
claim in a civil action and thus no pecuniary damage.
The State continues to argue that the trial court had alternative grounds to
order restitution in this case. (Appellee's Brief at 15-16). The fact is that the trial
court did not rely on alternative grounds but relied upon a demonstration of
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pecuniary damages that must be founded in civil liability. Any civil liability can
be and was, in this case, waived.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER PRINCIPLES OF COMPARATIVE FAULT
AND IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS RELATED THERETO.
The Defendant will not reargue this point. The Defendant has demonstrated
that it was the only party who submitted any credible evidence relating to the
automobile accident in this case. The State relied simply upon the Defendant's
plea. Again, the State does not dispute that what the victims could recover against
the Defendant in a wrongful death and personal injury suit arising from a motor
vehicle accident was dictated by Utah's Liability Reform Act. Under the Act,
recovery could be had against the Defendant only for the damages represented by
his degree of fault. U.C.A. 78-27-38(2) and (3) (2005 as Amended).
Defendant presented the trial court with the investigating officer's report in
this matter describing how the accident occurred and the toxicology report. (R.
411-419) As part of the presentation before the trial court, the Defendant attached
the report of his expert, Greg DuVal concerning the accident. As detailed therein,
Mrs. Raymond turned left at a controlled intersection, in front of the Defendant.
The Defendant was traveling at a reasonable speed and based upon the
reconstruction of the accident, responded within normal limits, to Mrs. Raymond's
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turn in front of him. Although the Defendant had consumed illegal drugs before
the accident, the Defendant's speed, perception and reaction time were all within
normal limits.
Certainly the Defendant has a legal duty to obey the signal and enter the
intersection under a green or yellow light. However, Mrs. Haymond had strict
legal duties that she violated which the Defendant analyzed thoroughly in his
opening brief

Despite the argument of the State as to why the Defendant was

more culpable that the other driver, there is no question that both parties bore some
responsibility and a factual determination of the responsibility of each had to be
made. (See Appellee's Brief at 16-23) There was more than enough credible
evidence to require a finding of the trial court.
What is missing from the State's presentation, of course, is the citation to the
Record or the trial court's findings and order where the comparative negligence
issue was even discussed by the court. The Defendant submitted expert testimony
on the issue in the form of Greg DuVal's report. The State produced nothing
except the Defendant's plea. The State would never have been entitled to summary
judgment based upon the same scenario in a civil action and, therefore, the trial
court had a duty to consider and make findings with regard to comparative fault.
The State fails to identify any such findings.
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER STATUTORY ELEMENTS AND IN
FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS RELATED THERETO.
The Act requires trial courts to make two separate restitution determinations,
and defines the criteria and procedures to be followed in making those assessments.
See id. § 77-38a-302(l), (2).

The trial court must determine both complete

restitution, the amount necessary to compensate a victim for all pecuniary losses,
and court-ordered restitution, the amount the defendant will be required to pay as
part of the criminal case. See id. § 77-38a-302(2). When making these
determinations, courts must consider factors specified in the Act. See id. § 77-38a302(5). In addition to making the required restitution determinations, "the court
shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record." Id. § 77-3 8a302(3). Under the plain language of the Act, a court does not, however, have
discretion to not make restitution determinations with supporting findings. By
express language, the Act imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a judge to make
the appropriate determinations regarding restitution, along with the rationale to
explain the decision. See id. § 77-38a-302(2), (3).
Despite the argument by the State (Appellee's Brief at 23-25), there is no
evidence in this case that Judge Stott considered any of the factors in the statute.
There are totally inadequate findings and no oral discussion where the trial court
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revealed it considered the factors. Certainly the test in Utah is not that it is assumed
the trial court made the necessary considerations in his head. Unless that is the test,
the Defendant submits that the Record and the Findings and Order are dispositive of
the lack of findings
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did in fact commit reversible
error in awarding restitution to Safeco Insurance.
Dated this/ [ day of May, 2007.
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